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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INRE: 
Case No. 
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL, 11546 
Disciplinary Proceeding 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
POINT I 
THE BAR BRIEF DOES NOT EVEN AT-
TEMPT TO ANSWER OUR LEGAL CONTE~ 
TIONS AS TO DEPRIVATION OF SPEEDY 
TRIAL AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 
The Bar has not responded to our claim that Brid-
well was denied his Constitutional right to a speedy 
trial. In this particular argument, we are not com-
plaining about the lack of promptness of 'Vagner in 
complaining to the Bar. We are complaining of the way 
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in which the rnatter was handled by the Bar after corn-
plaint. The record shows nearly six years from com-
plaint to trial.Our contention is that lawyers are entitled 
to a speedy trial and other Constitutional safeguards 
every bit as much as persons charged with crimes in the 
courts. The authorities which we cited in our brief are 
conclusive that lawyers are entitled to the Constitu-
tional right of a speedy trial. Bridwell was deprived of 
this right and accordingly is entitled to have these pro-
ceedings dismissed. The Bar has not answered this 
charge. 
The Bar also has not answered the charge we made 
in Point YI of our brief where it was pointed out that 
the Bar was allowed to add a new charge by amend-
ment at the hearing on this matter. Bridwell was denied 
his Constitutional right of being notified of the charge 
and having an opportunity to defend it. The Ruffalo 
case, cited in our brief, has clearly held that lawyers are 
entitled to this Constitutional right and Bridwell was 
denied it in regard to the conflict of interest charge as 
to the building transaction. The Bar has failed to answer 
this assertion and this charge should be dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE BAR BRIEF CONTAINS NUMEROUS 
UNWARRANTED INFERENCES AND INN~ 
ENDO ES AND PAINTS A GROSSLY UNFAIR 
PICTURE OF BRIDWELL. 
2 
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1. BRIDWELL DID NOT KEEP \V AGNER 
OUT OF THE COUNTRY, WAGNER KEPT 
HIMSELF OUT. 
On page 2, the Bar infers that Bridwell sent Wag-
ner out of the country and kept him out for the next 
four years so that he could have a free hand in stripping 
the company of its assets. This inference is not only 
unsupported by the evidence but it demonstrates a form 
of cynicism that should have no place in a proceeding 
of this nature. 
In the first place, it was Wagner's idea to leave 
the country. He had not even seen Bridwell before he 
left. He left because he had been questioned at great 
length by Internal Revenue agents and apparently de-
cided that it was better for him to leave. After taking 
over the representation of Wagner and Precisa, Brid-
well did advise 'Vagner of the possibility of criminal 
prosecution, such as any good lawyer would do. How-
ever, on many occasions he made it clear to Wagner that 
remaining out of the country was strictly his own deci-
s10n. 
For instance, in Bridwell's letter of February 27, 
19til, Exhibit M, he states in part: 
"As you know, there is a fraud penalty pro-
posed for 1957, and in my opinion these matters 
should all be resolved before you risk return to 
the States. That is, if you do not care to run the 
risk of criminal prosecution. However, that is 
your sole choice. There is no assurance that you 
~ould be prosecuted, and on the other hand, 
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there is no assurance that you wouldn't be prose-
cuted. The choice remains now as always and it 
must be you who makes up your mind as to what 
you want to do insofar as returning to the States 
is concerned." 
Again, in Bridwell' s letter to \V agner of October 30, 
1957, Exhibit I, 
"I do, however, have eyery reason to believe 
that I would be successful in compromise and dis-
missal of criminal action against you so that the 
doors of the U.S.A. will not be forever closed 
to you." 
And again in Exhibit 2, January 17, 1958: 
"At this point, I do not feel it advisable for 
you to return to the United States unless you 
wish to risk criminal prosecution. You know 
more about that than I do and if you have no 
unreported income I would recommend that 
you do return as I am not concerned about being 
able to prove facts. You answer that question 
for me and be your own guide." 
"In order to completely and successfully de-
fend you in the tax court and remove any pos-
sibility of criminal prosecution, it would be neces-
sary to show by your bank records in Switzer-
land, your personal account, that you had so 
much money when you came to this country and 
you should be able to show a source from which 
that money came. You should also be able to 
show further deposits and explain their source 
and show payment of taxes thereon. If you can 
do that, I unequivocally recommend to you that 
vou immediately come back to the United 
. ,, 
States. 
4 
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Wagner himself states in his letter of June 13, 1958 
to Bridwell, Exhibit I, 
"As long as they hold fraud against me, I 
think I should not return." 
With the record in this state and with the pre-
sumption of innocence to which Bridwell is entitled, it 
is grossly unfair to inf er that Bridwell kept \Vagner 
out of the country to further some diabolical scheme of 
his own. In addition to this, Wagner's later conduct 
shows his propensity in running out when prosecution 
is possible. 
2. \V AGNER WAS NOT IN THE DARK 
AS TO THE FEES AND EXPENSES DRAWN 
BY BRIDWELL. 
The Bar brief infers that Bridwell kept Wagner 
in the dark as to fees and expenses which were drawn. 
Again, this inference is unreasonable in the light of 
this record and in regard to the presumption of inno-
cence which should be given to Bridwell. 
The record is clear that 'the bank statements were 
being sent to the company office where there were two 
employees who owed their loyalty strictly to the com-
pany. We can certainly assume that 'Vagner received 
these bank statements. Bridwell did not and does not 
know of their whereabouts. In addition to this, Nellie 
\Yagner was employed in this office during the period 
of time in question . Throughout the correspondence of 
Bridwell and 'V agner one thing keeps appearing over 
5 
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and over again, and that is that there was numerous 
correspondence between 'Vaguer and his ex-wife, X el-
lie. Time and again it appears that Nellie has written 
to 'V agner and informed him as to certain matters 
involved in the tax litigation. (Exhibits I, M, 4, 38, 
39) In addition to this, it appears that lV agner cor-
responded with Nielson (Exhibit 5) whom he knew 
to be the accountant working on the case. In view of 
these facts plus the unchangeable fact of 'y agner' s per-
sonality as an inquisitive bookkeeper, we certainly can-
not assume that 'Vagner just sat like a lump in Switzer-
land without making inquiries, without receiving infor-
mation and being kept completely in the dark. This does 
not comport with the logic of this record. 
3. BRID,VELL DID NOT 'VITHHOLD IN-
FORMATION ABOUT THE BUILDING GO-
ING INTO DEFAULT. 
The Bar brief infers that Bridwell intentionally 
kept 'Vagner and the corporation in the dark as to the 
building going into def a ult. This is simply not true. 
The brief states on page 3, 
"In :May, 1961, he informed 'Vagner for the 
first time of the disposition of the property which 
had been accomplished two years before (Exhibit 
5) . 'V agner was furious (Exhibit 6) . He thought 
the payments were still being made." 
The Bar's own Exhibit 40 proves the fallacy of the fore-
going statements and shows how grossly unfair they 
6 
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are. This is a letter dated July 20, 1959 from Bridwell 
to \Vagner, where Bridwell states: 
"1'he payments on the building are not cur-
rent for the reason that there is no point in my 
advancing money to pay on the building in the 
event that the tax cases cannot be won, as that 
money would just inure to the benefit of pay-
ment of taxes, and unless we obtain the testimony 
that you know we need, there is no point. in throw-
ing good money after bad." (Italics ours). 
In light of this letter, can Wagner and the Bar really 
assert to this Court that 'Vaguer was completely un-
informed about the building? Not only as above stated, 
did \Vagner have access to the bank statements and 
should have known of the condition of the bank bal-
ance, but in this letter, Bridwell specifically told him 
that the payments were not being kept current and that 
he adYised against making any further payments. 
Then, on May 19, 1961, Bridwell stated: 
"Also, as you undoubtedly are aware, Mr. 
Hines foreclosed the contract on the Precisa 
building approximately two years ago." (Italics 
ours) 
4. THE THREE CHECKS FLASHED ON 
BRID\VELL AT THE HEARING 'VERE DE-
POSITED IN BRID,VELL'S ACCOUNT BE-
CAUSE THERE \VAS NO OTHER PLACE TO 
DEPOSIT THEM. 
The Bar makes much of the charge of Bridwell 
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despositing the three checks in his own account. Yet, 
the Bar's brief states on pg. 3, 
"By May, 1959 or earlier, the bank account 
was entirely depleted (Ex. 5." (Italics ours). 
What the Bar failed to realize at that point was that 
if the account were inactive, closed or attached by the 
Government, Bridwell could not be expected to deposit 
the checks in the company account. The dates of these 
three checks are 12-16-58, 7-21-59 and 8-7-59. Just as 
Bridwell stated in his testimony, had the checks been 
shown to him while the facts were fresh, he would have 
had a satisfactory explanation. Is this giving Bridwell 
the benefit of the doubt to which he is entitled? 
5. BRIDWELL KEPT WAGNER FULLY 
INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS OF THE 
TAX SETTLEMENTS. 
The Bar brief infers that Bridwell kept Wagner 
m the dark as to the progress of the tax settlements. 
This inference is without basis in the record. Some four 
to five months prior to the correspondence pertaining 
to the September, 1961 trip to Switzerland, Bridwell, 
in a letter to vVagner dated February 27, 1961, Exhibit 
lVI, informs Wagner of the settlement: 
"As yet, altfwugh all of the mechanics of the 
settlement of our tax cases through the year 
1956 have been agreed to a.s per my previous cor-
respondence to you, the formal documents have 
not been executed. However, I expect and be-
8 
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lieve that the reason for that is that the Govern-
ment counsel in San Francisco are swamped with 
matters on the tax docket. I do not anticipate 
any trouble in having our agreement finally ex-
ecuted and adhered to by the Government. I do 
not, however, want to push the matter, but 
should let it go in its own time." (Italics ours) . 
And again in Exhibit 5, dated May 19, 1961, Bridwell 
states: 
"At that time the company had absolutely no 
money, of course, so one of my clients advanced 
the money, which was very risky, bec.,use as you 
will recall there was a great deficiency deter-
mined against the corporation. However, that 
has been resolved and the corporation is no longer 
in jeopardy as pertains to any property it might 
own." (Italics ours) 
These letters show complete revelation of facts on 
Bridwell' s part with no desire to hide anything from 
Wagner. Bridwell informed Wagner the the mechanics 
of the settlement through the year 1956 had been 
worked out and that it was merely a matter of time 
until it was finished, with the year 1957 still unsettled. 
These were and are the true facts of the situation. 
The Bar brief infers that Bridwell withheld this 
information and kept Wagner and the corporation in 
the dark, particularly in regard to its argument con-
cerning Bridwell's second trip and the need therefor. 
The Bar has taken 'Vagner' s word, the word of a lay-
man unschooled in tax litigation. Bridwell's explanation 
of the necessity of the trip is believable and should 
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have been believed by the Bar. Bridwell testified that 
though the settlements had been completed through 
year 1956, Wagner's tax liability for the year 1957 was 
still unsettled and that accordingly things were in a 
fine state of balance, and that the entire matter could 
have been easily upset if the I.R.S. came to suspect 
that all of the representations which had been made 
to it were not entirely true. This was the reason why 
Bridwell wanted to have the voluminous affidavit, Ex-
hibit E, signed by the corporation and \Vagner, espe-
cially since he had represented to I.R.S. that it would 
be. That failing, he felt that he needed some further 
documentation, especially as to the building transaction 
lo keep the Government satisfied. This reason is per-
fectly plausible and should have been believed over the 
unsupported word of a layman attempting to pass hind-
sight judgment on the lack of need for Bridwell to 
come to Switzerland. 
Incidentally, the Bar brief infers that we are deal-
ing with a small corporation and an orthopedic limb 
factory in Switzerland. The true fact is that the factory 
in Switzerland which produces calculating machines 
distributes its machines in every country in the world 
with the exception of Iron Curtain countries. (See par. 
:2, Exhibit E) 
6. PART OF THE REFUND OF PRECISA'S 
_MONEY \YAS USED TO PAY \VAGNER'S 
PROPERTY TAX - THIS \:VAS A LOAN TO 
\VAGNER. 
10 
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The Bar brief has misstated the facts in regard to this 
item. To begin with, the property on Redwood Road 
war; owned b;y TVagner and not the corporation. Next, 
the Bar brief infers that Wagner was entitled to the 
~15,520.70 refund. This monelJ did not belong to Wag-
ner but belonged to the corporation. Bridwell used part 
of this money to pay the property tax on property 
owned by Wagner on Redwood Road and, therefore, 
Bridwell's statement concerning loaning the money to 
'Vagner was entirely correct. The entire tenor of the 
Bar brief is to the effect that 'V agner was and is the 
corporation. This fact is simply not so. Wagner owned 
less than one-fifth of the stock of the corporation. The 
corporation paid all but $2,000 of the fees and costs, 
and the corporation has made no complaint concerning 
Bridwell' s fees and costs. "\\T agner would have us be-
lieve that he was the corporation. This is a far different 
'V agner than the one who wrote the letter to Bridwell 
on October 22, 1957 while the heat was on. With charac-
teristic chameleon-like agility, Wagner then stated, 
Exhibit G: 
"That night I had a heart attack and a nerv-
ous condition and I thought it best to fligh to 
Switzerland immediately to report to Mr. Jost 
in behalf of the factory and let Mr. Grothe take 
care of the tax revision. I am not a member of 
the Board for over a year. Two members of the 
Board are in Salt Lake, Mr. Grothe and Mr. 
Bruderer. They are the head and have all legal 
authorities to deal with these people and I will 
explain to the factory to get all those papers 
which we will need to solve that tax problem. 
11 
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~Ir. Grothe probably will call on you as soon as 
he feels that he is in need of legal help. I know 
you will give him your best assistance." 
7. BRIDWELL DID NOT AND COULD NOT 
COERCE WAGNER, JOST AND PRECISA 
A.G. TO SIGN THE MINUTES AND POWER 
OF ATTORNEY. 
The Bar brief blithely states that Bridwell coerced 
Wagner and Precisa A.G. to sign the minutes and 
general power of attorney. The brief also states that 
"'V agner and his colleagues signed the minutes pre-
pared by Bridwell." These statements are not supported 
by the record. 
To begin with, Wagner's "colleagues" were the 
principals of a giant Swiss corporation selling calcu-
lating machines in every country in the world except 
for the Iron Curtain countries. The corporation had its 
own legal counsel advising it. \V agner also had his own 
legal counsel advising him. After the discussion with 
Bridwell, according to Bridwell, Wagner accepted the 
full revelation which was made to him by Bridwell 
orally and in the accountings prepared by Nielson 
which were furnished to Wagner. Wagner not only 
accepted this report but helped by typing the minutes 
and general power of attorney and helped to convince 
the Board members of Presica A.G. that they should 
sign the minutes and general power of attorney. 
It is absolutely ridiculous for the Bar to hold 
that Bridwell, going into a foreign country, could oyer-
12 
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whelm all of these people and their legal counsel. Even 
in VV agner' s own self-serving letter of December 25, 
1901, Wagner refutes his testimony in this proceeding 
that Bridwell was entitled to nothing more than $17 ,-
000.00 for fees and costs. Even at that time, 'Vaguer 
agreed to everything except additional fees for Brid-
well. These additional fees were specifically authorized 
in the minutes. Bridwell had absolute authority under 
the general power of attorney to make the distribution 
that he did. 
8. OTHER MISSTATEMENTS IN THE 
BAR BRIEF. 
(a) Throughout the brief, the Bar refers to Frank 
Nielson as "his accountant." This is not entirely correct 
inasmuch as Nielson was working for both Wagner 
and the corporation and was an independent certified 
public accountant hired by Bridwell pursuant to the 
carte blanche authority which he mentioned at the out-
set that he would need. In addition, in Exhibit 5 we 
see that 'Vaguer is corresponding directly with Niel-
son, as he was entitled to do, and it is inconceivable 
to us that a man of Wagner's business background 
could not correspond directly and ask Nielson any 
question he desired. For him to attempt to hoodwink 
the llar of this State into believing that he was kept 
under a cloak of darkness is ridiculous. 
(h) The Bar brief states that Bridwell withdrew 
the $4,000 receiYed from the Metropolitan Finance 
13 
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Loan ''ostensibly" to finance a trip for himself and his 
accountant. This statement is grossly unfair in view 
of the fact that the Bar knows that this trip was spe-
cifically authorized and necessary. It appears to us 
ridiculous that anyone could think for one minute that 
a lawyer and an accountant making a trip to Switzer-
land to work on the tax cases for a period of three weeks 
would be expected to advance their own money for the 
trip. It is certainly understandable for Bridwell to 
believe that he could use corporate money for this pur-
pose and later account for it. This is what he did and 
his accounting was approved. The Bar brief complained 
that he has not furnished the Bar with receipts show-
ing expenditures for meals, hotel bills and every other 
expense incurred on this trip. Our response is that the 
I.R.S. had to approve of these expenditures and did. 
( c) The Bar brief states that Bridwell did not 
inform Wagner or Precisa of the receipt of the refund 
until 'Vagner's return and that then he did not divulge 
its disbursement. This is in the face of direct evidence 
from Bridwell that he did divulge the disbursement to 
\Vagner and that part of it was actually used for pay-
ment of real property taxes on property owned by 
'Vagner. Certainly Wagner and the corporation knew 
that the refund was coming, and Bridwell was given 
the general power of attorney to deal with it in accord-
ance with the minutes of the corporation. He did this 
by paying the accountant and the additional fees to 
himself and loaning the money to 'Vagner for the pay-
ment of 'V agner' s property taxes. 
14 
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Wagner has not shown us any more than one 
attempt to get information from Nielson. Certainly 
Nielson's door was open to him during all of this period 
of time and he would have given him a complete account-
ing at any time desired. Why must we assume that 
Nielson refused to give Wagner any information until 
October 1962? \i\Te assume that the information was 
available any time that Wagner wanted it. 
( d) The Bar brief complains that Bridwell with-
held information and did not keep Wagner informed. 
Yet, all of the correspondence introduced into evidence 
in this case, most of which was introduced by Wagner, 
shows Bridwell continually explaining to Wagner what 
was going on. Indeed, in the letter of July 18, 1961, 
Exhibit 7, in speaking of the necessity of making the 
trip to Switzerland, Bridwell ~tates: 
"There are many and important matters that 
I must discuss with the majority stockholders in 
Precisa Calculating Machine Company at the 
earliest possible time. Of course, I would also 
like to give you a run down on all that has hap-
pened to date." 
The Bar brief infers that Bridwell did not reveal the 
progress of the tax settlements, and in Exhibit 17, the 
letter of October 27, 1961, Bridwell states: 
"Bear in mind that the additional tax comes 
about by arbitrary agreement as being one-half 
of the fraud penalty due to those items as re-
ferred to in said letter. That was the concession 
I made in order to get the settlement and in 
15 
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order to avoid having the label of fraud appear 
anyplace in the settlement, which of course, goes 
a long way toward preventing prosecution. If 
this is not clear to you, please read the September 
II, 1961 letter again very carefully as the tax 
matters are related that pertain to you." 
Incidentally, where is this letter of September 11, 1961 ! 
\Vagner produced no such letter. The only conclusion 
we can draw from this failure in view of the fact that 
he produced every other letter that he felt to be im-
portant, was that this letter must have inured to the 
benefit of Bridwell. As we have stated in our brief, 
due to the unusual length of time for the prosecution 
of this matter and two changes of partnerships, Brid-
well has been unable to find much of the correspondence 
in regard to this matter. However, we can only assume 
that the meticulous bookkeeper, Wagner, kept every-
thing, and we ask, why did he not produce the letter 
of September 11, 1961 which contained a complete 
breakdown as to the tax settlements and a thorough 
explanation? 
( e) Wagner would have us believe that not one 
word had been said about even the existence of a refund 
and yet, in Exhibit 16, Bridwell's letter of October 12, 
Bridwell speaks of the interest of I.R.S. in whether or 
not any of the refunded money would go to Switzerland. 
This indicates that all parties knew that a refund was 
coming and the lack of any inquiry at all by Precisa 
A.G., the majority stockholder, indicates that they felt 
16 
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that this matter was entirely taken care of pursuant 
to the minutes and the general power of attorney. 
'Ve submit that the foregoing statements, infer-
ences and innuendoes designed to prejudice this Court 
against Bridwell are not supported by the record of 
this case and are not in keeping with the burden of 
i;roof which the Bar has in this case to prove the charges 
by clear and convincing evidence. We submit that 
Bridwell, as any member of the Bar under attack by 
disgruntled ex-clients, is entitled to the benefit of the 
doubt and is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The 
Bar brief has not accorded him that right and is grossly 
unfair. 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Rawlings, Roberts & Black 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for George E. Bridwell 
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